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Abstract
The standard monopoly pricing problem is re-considered when the buyer can
disclose his type (e.g. age, income, experience) at some cost. In the optimal sales
mechanism with costly disclosure, the seller posts a price list, including a \sticker
price" available to any buyer and a schedule of discounts available to those who
disclose certain types. Unambiguous welfare implications of such a pricing policy
are available in the limiting case when the buyer's type is fully informative: (i) The
buyer is better o and the monopolist worse o when disclosure is more costly. (ii)
When discounts are suciently rare, social welfare is strictly less than if the seller
could not oer discounts.
1 Introduction
In classic models of monopoly pricing of an indivisible, perishable good, the seller's
information about the buyer is treated as exogenous. For example, a monopolist may
know the buyer's willingness to pay (\rst-degree price discrimination"), the buyer's
payo-relevant type (\third-degree p.d."), or nothing about the buyer except the overall
population from which he is drawn. In some settings, it is natural to view information
Email: david.mcadams@duke.edu, Post: A416, Duke Fuqua School of Business, One Towerview Rd,
Durham, NC 27708. I thank seminar participants at UCLA and Ohio State, Bob Pindyck, Jim Anton,
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about the buyer as being known to the seller a priori, e.g. employee discounts, as being
costlessly observable by the seller, e.g. \ladies' night" discounts at a nightclub, or as being
costlessly disclosable by the buyer, e.g. the Kama'aina rate oered only to Hawaiian
residents. If so, the monopoly pricing problem reduces to nding an optimal take-it-or-
leave-it price to oer buyers in each separate segment.
Other times, such information about buyers is not readily available. Retailers would
like to oer discounts to bargain-hunters, but cannot directly verify a customer's price sen-
sitivity. One solution is to oer discounts through channels that target bargain hunters.
Newspaper coupons are a classic example, as price-conscious customers are more likely to
search for and clip coupons, and many more such channels have now developed on the in-
ternet. For instance, Keycode.com oers online coupons on behalf of dozens of nationwide
retailers, charging sellers each time a coupon is used. Similarly, Restaurants.com oers
coupons worth from $10 - $100 at over 13,000 restaurants (as of May 2010), charging
buyers 40 cents for each dollar of discount.
Another solution is for the buyer (or seller) to share (or gather) information directly,
again often at a cost. For example, the drug manufacturer Genentech oers lower prices
to patients who cannot aord the $50,000 price-tag for its cancer-ghting drug Avastin,
through its Avastin Access Solutions program, but only after patients meet with a coun-
selor to review their nancial situation and insurance coverage.1 Similarly, many private
colleges and high schools oer generous nancial aid, but only to those who prove that
they cannot aord to pay full tuition.
This paper takes a rst step toward endogenizing the seller's information about the
buyer, by allowing the buyer to credibly disclose hard information about himself, at some
cost to the buyer and/or to the seller. The optimal sales mechanism in this setting takes
the form of what I call a \price-list mechanism". Any buyer who does not disclose faces
1Genentech likely has a powerful public-relations motive to provide Avastin to patients who cannot
aord to pay full price. This paper's analysis can accommodate such concerns, by modeling Genentech
as having a \negative cost of service" for such patients.
2a take-it-or-leave-it \sticker price", while those who disclose certain pre-specied types
qualify for a customized discount. The seller's information about the buyer is endogenous
in this mechanism. In particular, the seller does not learn about those buyers who do
not purchase its product, nor about those who pay sticker price.
The ndings here qualify some well-known welfare comparative statics. Consider the
extreme case in which the buyer's type is his true willingness to pay (or \value") for
the good. Social welfare is strictly higher under perfect price discrimination, when the
buyer's value is known a priori to the seller, than under uniform pricing. Suppose now
that the buyer's value is not known a priori, but can be disclosed at some cost. As
long as the cost of disclosure is in an intermediate range, so that the buyer's value is
disclosed with a small enough but positive probability in the optimal mechanism, I show
that expected social welfare is lower than under uniform pricing. In other words, as long
as discounts are suciently rare in the prot-maximizing mechanism, a regulator could
increase social welfare by forcing the seller not to oer discounts.
The seller's cost is assumed to be zero in the main model considered here, but all
results extend to settings in which the cost of service varies across buyers. Such cost of
service can be broadly interpreted to include ancillary benets of service enjoyed by the
seller. For example, MGM Mirage oers free membership in its Players' Club, a casino
loyalty program. By identifying themselves (and thereby disclosing their likelihood to lose
money at the hotel casino), gamblers in the Players' Club qualify for personalized deals on
rooms and other hotel amenities. Similarly, Schneider (2009) nds that auto mechanics
charge local customers less on average for a diagnostic exam ($37.70 vs. $59.75), perhaps
in part because of the potential for repeat business or positive word of mouth.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The introduction continues with a
discussion of some related literature. Section 2 provides a self-contained analysis of an
2 In Schneider's eld experiment, a discount was oered when the buyer merely claimed to live nearby.
Even if such claims are cheap talk, however, not all buyers may be aware that making such a claim will
lead to a discount. Thus, such cheap-talk claims can still serve to \disclose" potentially payo-relevant
information about the buyer, namely, that he is aware of this opportunity to get a better price.
3illustrative limiting case of the main model in which the buyer's type is fully informative
of his value. Section 3 then presents the main model, in which the buyer can disclose
an imperfectly informative type. Section 4 contains the bulk of the analysis, including
extensions to allow for nitely many types, xed costs of enabling disclosure, and private
costs of service. Section 5 concludes with some comments and directions for future
research. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Related literature. Most closely related is Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)'s classic pa-
per on the optimality of posted prices in monopoly pricing. A key feature of posted
price mechanisms is that each buyer receives the good with probability zero or one. The
optimality of such non-random allocation rules is not obvious once buyer disclosure is
possible. For example, might the seller increase its expected prot by sometimes with-
holding the good from those buyers who do not disclose? This paper shows that, indeed,
it is optimal to oer non-disclosing buyers a posted price (the \sticker price"), albeit a
higher price than without disclosure. Also related in this vein is the literature on the wel-
fare eects of market segmentation (Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985)). Again, the
dierence here is that the seller's information about the buyer is costly and endogenous.3
A complementary literature is that on monopoly menu pricing (\second-degree price
discrimination"). The monopolist in that literature extracts more of the total surplus
from trade by allowing the buyer to choose among dierent goods, sorting dierent types
of buyers on volume (e.g. Wilson (1993)), delay (e.g. Chiang and Spatt (1982)) and/or
quality (e.g. Deneckere and McAfee (1996)). The main dierence here is that the buyer
can reveal information about himself directly through disclosure rather than indirectly
through product choice. Some examples such as movie ticket pricing combine elements
of menu pricing (e.g. matinee discounts) with elements of pricing based on disclosed
3Since the monopolist's prots are always higher when the buyer's type can be disclosed than under
uniform pricing, facilitating disclosure can be viewed as a rent-seeking activity (Posner (1975)). Thus,
any welfare gains that might arise from such information revelation could be diminished or reversed by
the cost of rent-seeking.
4information (e.g. senior citizen and student discounts). In other settings, the buyer's
menu of options may itself depend on what the buyer has disclosed. Characterizing the
prot-maximizing pricing mechanism in this more general setting is an important area
for future research. However, to isolate what is new, this paper focuses on the special
case of a single, indivisible, perishable good.
While similar in spirit, this paper is very dierent from the literatures on disclosure
(e.g. Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981)) and mechanism design with partially ver-
iable information (e.g. Green and Laont (1986) and Bull and Watson (2005)). In
these literatures, all messages are costless. Here, sending a \credible message" is costly.4
Somewhat more related is the literature following Townsend (1979) on costly state ver-
ication. For example, Border and Sobel (1987) consider optimal taxation when the
taxation authority can verify (\audit") a citizen's wealth at some cost.5 The analogous
question in monopoly pricing, of how to design an optimal sales mechanism when the
seller can conduct a costly audit to learn the buyer's type, is interesting and important
but remains an open question. In particular, this paper does not address the question of
optimal monopoly auditing.
2 Illustrative case: perfect disclosure
Before presenting the formal model, I will develop intuition and some welfare results in
a setting in which (i) the buyer is able to disclose his true willingness to pay (or \value")
v 2 [0;1) for the good, at cost c  0, and (ii) the seller commits to a price list, i.e. a
list of take-it-or-leave-it prices depending on whether and what the buyer discloses.
Denition 1 (Price list). A price list p : (fNOg [ D) ! R species a take-it-or-leave-
4If disclosure is costless, the solution to the seller's mechanism design problem is trivial: withhold the
good unless the buyer discloses his type and then set an optimal posted price conditional on his type.
5I am unaware of any papers that consider optimal pricing when the seller can verify the buyer's type
at some cost. Severinov and Deneckere (2006) consider a monopoly pricing context in which the buyer
can misrepresent his private information at some cost.
5it \sticker price" p(NO) to any buyer who does not disclose his value, as well as a
\customized price" p(v) to any buyer who discloses value v 2 D  [0;1); D is the set
of buyers who qualify for a discount.
Let F(), f() denote the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of the buyer's value.
The model of perfect disclosure considered here is a limiting case of the model to be
presented in Section 3, in which the buyer is able to disclose a \type" that is imperfectly
informative of his value. This limiting case is of special interest for two reasons. First, the
expected prot-maximizing price list has a particularly simple and intuitive structure.
Second, unambiguous welfare implications are available that contrast with well-known
results from the literature on perfect price discrimination. In particular, whereas perfect
price discrimination increases total welfare relative to an optimal posted price when
observing the buyer's value is costless, such price discrimination decreases total welfare
whenever the cost of disclosure is high enough that discounts are suciently rare.
I begin by characterizing the optimal price list, as a function of disclosure cost c  0.
Proposition 1. The optimal price list oers customized price p(v) = v   c for all


















Corollary 1. Suppose that \marginal revenue" MR(p) =
d[p(1 F(p)]
d[1 F(p)] = p  
1 F(p)
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Intuition. In the standard monopoly pricing problem, the seller is forced to exclude all
buyers having values less than the posted price. Given the possibility of disclosure, the
seller may now instead oer such buyers the opportunity to qualify for a discount. Let
p be the optimal posted price. When c > p, the optimal sticker price p(NO) = p,
reecting the fact that the seller nds it unprotable to oer any discount that would
6induce excluded buyers to disclose their values. By contrast, when c < p, the seller can
strictly improve upon the optimal posted price by oering some customized discounts.
Example 1 (Linear demand). Consider the linear-demand case in which v  U[0;1],
illustrated in Figure 1. Without disclosure, the seller will set price p = 1
2 so that the
lowest-value buyer to receive the good has zero marginal revenue. The seller's expected
revenue in this case is 1
4, while the buyer's expected surplus is 1
8. For any disclosure cost
c  1
2, such uniform pricing remains optimal. When c < 1
2, by contrast, the seller can
increase prots by inducing buyers having values v 2 (c;1   c) to disclose. Each such
buyer can be charged a customized price p(v) = v   c that extracts all of the surplus
net of disclosure costs (\net surplus"), and that gives the seller more than that buyer's
marginal revenue MR(v) = 1   2v.
Overall, the seller's expected revenue is illustrated graphically in Figure 1 as the
area under the (bolded) upper envelope of marginal revenue MR(v), the net surplus
NS(v) = v c, and the x-axis. (The seller optimally induces disclosure here i NS(v) >
maxfMR(v);0g.) Namely, the seller's expected revenue is 1
2 c+c2 > 1
4 while the buyer's
expected surplus is c2=2 < 1
8.
Welfare implications. If disclosure is suciently costly, a prot-maximizing seller
simply oers a uniform price with no opportunities to qualify for a discount. On the
other hand, when disclosure is costless, the optimal price list amounts to costless, perfect
price discrimination. Thus, if c = 0, total welfare under the optimal price list is greater
than that under the optimal uniform price. More generally, how does welfare under the
optimal price list vary with the cost of disclosure, and compare with that under optimal
uniform pricing? Proposition 2 shows that the buyer and seller have conicting interests
to raise or lower the cost of disclosure, and that total welfare under the optimal price list
is less than that under the optimal uniform price whenever the cost of disclosure is in an
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Figure 1: Optimal sticker price given linear demand.
Proposition 2. The seller's expected prot is non-increasing in c while the buyer's ex
post surplus is non-decreasing in the disclosure cost c. Further, as long as the buyer
receives a discount suciently rarely, expected total welfare is strictly lower under the
optimal price list than under the optimal uniform price.
Intuition: Consider again the case of linear demand. As the cost of disclosure c decreases,
the optimal sticker price p(NO) = 1 c increases along with the set of buyer-types who
receive customized discounts. However, since such buyers earn zero surplus, every buyer-
type is at least weakly worse o as c decreases. Overall, as the cost of disclosure decreases
from 1
2 to any level c < 1
2, expected buyer welfare decreases by an amount equal to the
highlighted trapezoid in Figure 3.
By contrast, for all buyers having values v 2 (c;1 c), the seller is able to extract the
full net surplus v   c, whereas under uniform pricing such buyers would have generated







Figure 2: Total welfare depending on the cost of disclosure c.
Overall, as the cost of disclosure decreases from 1
2 to any level c < 1
2, expected seller
prot increases by an amount equal to the highlighted triangle in Figure 3.
As c ! 1
2, the seller's expected prot increase is only second-order, while the buyer's
expected welfare loss is rst-order. Consequently, there is a net expected welfare loss
whenever c  1
2 so that discounted transactions are suciently rare.
Example 1 continued. As shown earlier, total welfare under the optimal price list is
1=2   c + 3c2=2, which is (i) minimized at c = 1=3, (ii) maximized at c = 0, and (iii)
equals the total welfare under optimal uniform pricing at c = 1=2 and c = 1=6. Overall,
total welfare under the optimal price list is less than under the optimal uniform price i
c 2 (1=6;1=2). Since the buyer's value is uniformly distributed on [0;1] and he receives
a discount i v 2 (c;1   c) (and never if c > 1=2), this welfare nding can be re-stated
in terms of the probability that the buyer receives a discount. Namely, an optimal price
list generates less total welfare than an optimal uniform price i the buyer receives a

















































































































































































































































Figure 3: Welfare eects of costly disclosure of buyer values.
3 Model
A risk-neutral monopoly seller has an indivisible, perishable good and faces a single, risk-
neutral buyer. This buyer has willingness to pay (or \value") v 2 V  R+ and \type"
t 2 T, each his private information. As shorthand, I will refer to a buyer with value v
and type t simply as \buyer (v;t)". The buyer's type has density g() over measurable
type-space T while, conditional on type t, the buyer's value is distributed according to
c.d.f. F(jt) with p.d.f. f(jt). If the seller were to oer the object at price p to type-t
buyers, expected revenue would be R(p;t) = p(1 F(pjt)). I shall assume that R(p;t) is
strictly concave for all t.
The seller commits to a sales mechanism with costly disclosure. Buyer messages in
such a mechanism consist of both cheap-talk from a set X as well as, possibly, \disclosure"
of the buyer's type. (See discussion point (a) below.) Let M = X (T [f;g) denote the
space of potential messages, M; = Xf;g those available to all buyers and Mt = Xftg
10those available only to type-t buyers that serve to disclose type t. The sales mechanism
itself species an allocation function q(m) specifying the probability that the buyer gets
the object and a corresponding payment function z(m).
Disclosure is potentially costly, for both the buyer and the seller; in particular, the
buyer pays cB(t)  0 and the seller pays cS(t)  0 whenever the buyer discloses type t,
where c(t) = cB(t) + cS(t)  0 for all types t. (See point (b).)
Most of the analysis in the paper will focus on a sub-class of sales mechanisms with
costly disclosure, called \price-list mechanisms".
Denition 2 (Price-list mechanism). A price-list mechanism is a sales mechanism with
costly disclosure in which the buyer is oered a take-it-or-leave-it \sticker price" p(NO)
should he not disclose, or a take-it-or-leave-it \customized price" p(t) should he disclose
type t 2 D, for some D  T.6
Without loss of generality, we may further restrict attention to price lists in which
p(t)  p(NO)   cB(t) for all t 2 D; otherwise, buyers of type t strictly prefer to buy at
the sticker price without disclosing.
Discussion of the model. (a) In a standard setting in which buyer disclosure is not
possible, any extensive-form interaction between the buyer and seller is equivalent to a
direct-revelation mechanism by the Revelation Principle. With costly disclosure, how-
ever, the extensive form matters. I have chosen here to focus on a scenario in which the
buyer and seller cannot engage in a \conversation" with potentially several rounds of com-
munication, in which the cost of disclosure is incurred only if and when the buyer discloses
his type. Instead, the buyer here simply sends a single message. Such a conversation-less
model may be a better t with some applications, e.g. if the buyer must decide whether
6More formally, a price-list mechanism is one with cheap-talk message space X = V , allocation
probability q(v;;) = 1 if v > p(NO), q(v;t) = 1 if t 2 D and v > p(t) + cB(t), and q(m) = 0 otherwise;
(iii) payment z(v;;)) = p(NO) if v > p(NO), z(v;t) = p(t) if t 2 D and v > p(t) + cB(t), and z(m) = 0
otherwise.
11to incur the cost of being able to disclose before communication begins. For instance,
patients in Genentech's Avastin Access Solution program (mentioned in the introduc-
tion) must gather their nancial and insurance information and attend their interview
regardless of how that interview is conducted.
(b) The costs to the seller triggered by disclosure are by assumption unavoidable. For
example, retailers typically pay a fee whenever a buyer nds and uses an online coupon
at a coupon-aggregator website such as Keycode.com; using the coupon can be viewed
as \disclosing" that he is the sort of buyer who seeks out online coupons at that site.
4 Sales mechanisms with costly disclosure
In this section, I will characterize the expected prot-maximizing sales mechanism with
costly disclosure. Section 4.1 establishes that this optimal mechanism takes the form of
a price-list mechanism. Section 4.2 then characterizes the optimal price-list mechanism.
4.1 Optimality of price-list mechanisms
Before proceeding, it is helpful to review briey why a single posted price is the optimal
sales mechanism without disclosure, subject to the usual interim individual-rationality
(IR) and interim incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints.
Review: why a posted price is optimal without disclosure. Revelation Principle.
Without disclosure, it is without loss to restrict attention to direct-revelation mechanisms.
Let S(v) = vq(v) z(v) denote the interim expected surplus of a buyer having value v in
such a mechanism. (Recall that q(m) and z(m) are the buyer's probability of receiving
the good and payment, respectively, after sending message m.)
Envelope Theorem. IC requires S(v) = maxv0 vq(v0)   z(v0) so that S(v) = S(0) +
R v
0 q(~ v)d~ v by the Envelope Theorem. Buyer payment is then z(v) = vq(v)   S(v) =
vq(v)  
R v
0 q(~ v)d~ v   S(0). Thus, the seller's expected revenue depends only on (i) the


















d[1 F(v)] is the \marginal revenue" of the buyer having value v.
Zero surplus to zero-value buyers. Since expected revenue is decreasing in the zero-value
surplus S(0), it is without loss to focus on mechanisms in which S(0) = 0.
Marginal revenue. The optimal mechanism design problem now reduces to the problem
of choosing allocation probabilities. Selling to buyers having value v raises more revenue
from such buyers directly, for marginal ex ante gain f(v)v, but forces the seller also
to increase the interim surplus of all buyers having higher values, for marginal ex ante
loss (1   F(v)); the net eect on expected revenue is MR(v)f(v). The solution to this
problem is well-known: sell the good with probability one (zero) to all buyers having
value greater than (less than) v, where v 2 argmaxv
R 1
v MR(v)f(v)dv.
All together, the optimal sales mechanism is to oer a take-it-or-leave-it price equal
to v.
Discussion: what changes with disclosure? Not surprisingly, some standard tools of
optimal mechanism design remain powerful in this paper's setting. For example, let
S(v;t) denote the interim expected surplus of buyer (v;t). All buyers having the same
type t can only distinguish themselves through cheap talk. Thus, the Envelope Theorem
implies that S(v;t) = S(0;t) +
R v
0 q(~ v;t)d~ v for all types t. In particular, the seller's
expected revenue can be expressed as a function of (i) the allocation probabilities fq(v;t) :
v 2 V;t 2 Tg, (ii) the zero-value surpluses fS(0;t) : t 2 Tg, and (iii) the event Y ES in
which the buyer discloses his type.
On the other hand, the Revelation Principle does not apply here. Indeed, even as-
suming that the buyer sends a non-random message may entail loss of generality; in
13principle, the buyer might randomize over whether to send a cheap talk message or a
costly disclosing message. (In fact, the buyer sends a non-random message in the optimal
mechanism; see Lemma 1.)
Most importantly, the possibility of disclosure adds novel constraints to the mech-
anism design problem. In particular, incentive-compatibility requires that buyer (v;t)
disclose its type whenever S(v;t) > mint0 S(v;t0); otherwise some other buyer (v;t0)
would be able to protably deviate by \mimicking" buyer (v;t). Because of this \disclo-
sure IC constraint", it is not even clear that the seller will always oer zero surplus to
zero-value buyers. In particular, even though raising S(0;t) lowers the seller's expected
prot by (i) forcing the seller to oer type-t buyers more surplus and (ii) forcing the seller
to induce more type-t buyers to disclose, it also could help the seller by (iii) allowing the
seller not to induce disclosure by other types t0 6= t. Put more briey, raising the surplus
oered to type-t buyers could in principle increase prots by slackening the disclosure IC
constraint for other types of buyers. (In fact, zero-value buyers all receive zero surplus
in the optimal mechanism; see Lemma 4.)
Theorem 1. The optimal sales mechanism with costly disclosure satisfying interim
incentive-compatibility (IC) and interim individual-rationality (IR) (or, simply, \the op-
timal mechanism") is a price-list mechanism.
Theorem 4.1 is the most technically challenging result of the paper; the rest of this
section outlines its proof.
Part I: Non-random disclosure. Let M(v;t) be the set of messages sent with positive
probability by buyer (v;t). Lemma 1 establishes that, in the optimal sales mechanism,
buyer (v;t) is either certain to disclose t or certain not to disclose t. Thus, it is in fact
without loss to assume that the buyer sends a single message.
Denition 3 (Non-random disclosure). A sales mechanism with costly disclosure has
non-random disclosure if Pr(M(v;t)  M; or M(v;t)  Mt) = 1.
14Lemma 1. The optimal sales mechanism has non-random disclosure.
Sketch of Lemma 1's proof : Buyers who disclose randomly must be indierent between
disclosure and non-disclosure. If so, the seller can increase expected prot by breaking
this indierence in favor of non-disclosure, for a combination of reasons. First, because of
buyer (v;t)'s indierence, inducing non-disclosure does not force the seller to increase the
expected surplus oered to type-t buyers. Second, since non-disclosure was already an
option for buyer (v;t) in the original mechanism, no type-t0 buyer has any new incentive
to change its behavior, for all other types t0 6= t. All together, all buyer surpluses remain
the same after this change. On the other hand, inducing non-disclosure increases total
surplus by dissipating less through disclosure costs, increasing seller prot.
Denition 4 (Mechanisms with non-random disclosure). Any sales mechanism with non-
random disclosure can be characterized by a disclosure set Y ES = f(v;t) : M(v;t) 
Mtg, non-disclosure set NO = f(v;t) : M(v;t)  M;g, allocation probabilities fq(v;t) :
v 2 V;t 2 Tg, and buyer surpluses fS(v;t) : v 2 V;t 2 Tg.7
Since NO is the complement of Y ES (up to a zero-measure set), any mechanism with
non-random disclosure can be described simply as a triplet (Y ES;q(;);S(;)).
Part II: The seller's \relaxed problem".
Lemma 2. A mechanism with non-random disclosure (Y ES;q(;);S(;)) satises IR
and IC only if, for all (v;t),
S(0;t)  0 and S(v;t) =
Z v
0
q(~ v;t)d~ v + S(0;t) (3)
v
0 > v ) q(v
0;t)  q(v;t) (4)
S(v;t) > min
t0 S(v;t
0) ) (v;t) 2 Y ES: (5)
7 Buyer (v;t)'s payment z(v;t) = vq(v;t)   S(v;t)   cB  1(v;t)2Y ES.
15The seller's problem. The seller's expected prot in mechanism (Y ES;q(;);S(;))
equals the total surplus generated from allocating the object, minus total disclosure
costs, minus buyer surplus. Expressed in terms of \marginal revenue",8
E[PROFIT] =
Z Z  















q(v;t)MR(v;t)f(vjt)dv   c(t)Pr((v;t) 2 Y ESjt)

g(t)dt   E[S(0;t)] (7)
Denition 5 (Marginal revenue). The \marginal revenue" associated with buyer (v;t)
is MR(v;t) =
d[v(1 F(vjt))]
d(1 F(vjt)) = v  
1 F(vjt)
f(vjt) .9
Thus, the seller's objective is to select (Y ES;q(;);S(0;)) to maximize (7) subject
to buyer surpluses S(v;t) = S(0;t) +
R v
0 q(~ v;t)d~ v satisfying the appropriate IR and IC
constraints.
IR and IC constraints. Let S(v;t;v0;t0) = S(v0;t0)   (v0   v)q(v0;t0) denote buyer (v;t)'s
surplus upon \mimicking" buyer (v0;t0). IR requires that S(v;t)  0 for all (v;t). And
since buyer (v;t) can only feasibly mimic (v0;t0) if either t0 = t or (v0;t0) 2 NO, IC requires
that S(v;t)  S(v;t;v0;t) for all (v;t) and all v0 6= v and that S(v;t)  S(v;t;v0;t0) for
all (v;t) and all (v0;t0) 2 NO.
The seller's relaxed problem. Rather than solve the seller's problem directly, I shall pro-
ceed to solve rst the \relaxed problem" of nding (Y ES;q(;);S(0;) that maximize
(7) subject to the necessary conditions (3-5) of IR and IC. Then, I will show that the
solution to the relaxed problem satises IR and IC and hence is itself optimal.
Part III: Disclosure and allocation. Suppose that (Y ES;q(;));S(0;)) solves
the relaxed problem, and let S(v;t) = S(0;) +
R v
0 q(~ v;t)d~ v be the induced buyer
8The rst equality above follows from (3) while the second follows from integration by parts.
9MR(v;t) =
dR(1 F(vjt);t)
dq , where R(q;t) = qF 1(1 qjt) denotes the seller's expected revenue when
the good is sold with probability q.
16v
v;d(t) Disclosure: NO Y ES
Allocation: q;NO(v) 1
Figure 4: Type-t buyers' allocation probability and disclosure (Lemmas 3-4).
surpluses. Lemma 3 provides several properties of any such solution, listed in the order
in which they are proven in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 (Properties of the solution). The following properties must hold in any solution
to the relaxed problem, for a full-measure set of buyers:
(a) (v;t) 2 Y ES i S(v;t) > mint0 S(v;t0);
(b) 9 non-decreasing q;NO() such that (v;t) 2 NO implies q(v;t) = q;NO(v);
(c) v00 > v0 > v, (v;t) 2 NO, and (v0;t) 2 Y ES together imply (v00;t) 2 Y ES;
(d) v0 > v, v 2 NO, and v0 2 Y ES together imply q(v0;t) = 1; and
(e) 9 \disclosure thresholds" v;d(t) for all t, such that (v;t) 2 Y ES if v > v;d(t) and
(v;t) 2 NO if v < v;d(t).
Lemma 4 (Zero surplus to zero-value buyers). In any solution to the relaxed problem,
S(0;t) = 0 for a full-measure set of types t 2 T.
Lemmas 3-4 have several notable implications, summarized in Figure 4. First, any
buyer who does not disclose his type receives the good with a probability q;NO(v) that
depends on his value but not his type. Second, the buyer discloses his type i his value
lies above a threshold v;d(t)  1. Third, any buyer who discloses his type receives the
good with probability one.
Given these results, the seller's relaxed problem reduces to choosing an allocation
probability q;NO(v) 2 [0;1] for every value v and a disclosure threshold v;d(t) 2 V [f1g







(MR(v;t)   c(t))f(vjt)g(t)dvdt; (8)
subject only to the monotonicity constraint that q;NO() is non-decreasing. (Since
q(v;t) = q;NO(v) for all v < v;d(t) and q(v;t) = 1 for all v > v;d(t), q(v;t) is
non-decreasing in v for all t i q;NO(v) is non-decreasing in v.)
For the moment, treat the disclosure thresholds v;d() as xed and consider the
problem of how to optimally select non-decreasing allocation probabilities q;NO() for
non-disclosers. This problem is equivalent to the standard monopoly pricing problem,
when faced with an isolated market segment in which values have c.d.f. ~ F(v) = Pr(v0 <
vjv0 < v;d(t)). As is well known, the seller maximizes prots by selling the object with
probability one (zero) when v > v;NO (v < v;NO), where the threshold v;NO can be
interpreted as a take-it-or-leave-it price.
Lemma 5 (Allocation threshold for non-disclosers). In any solution to the relaxed prob-
lem, there exists an \allocation threshold" v;NO such that q;NO(v) = 0 if v < v;NO and
q;NO(v) = 1 if v > v;NO.
Part IV: Optimality of a price-list mechanism.
Lemma 6 (Price-list mechanism). The solution to the seller's relaxed problem is a price-
list mechanism in which (i) the set of types that qualify for a discount D = ft 2 T :
v;d(t) < v;NOg, (ii) each type t 2 D is oered customized price p(t) = v;d(t)   cB(t),
and (iii) the sticker price p(NO) = v;NO for all t 2 D.
Lemma 6 completes the proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 6, the solution to the
seller's relaxed problem is a price-list mechanism (D;p(NO);p(t) : t 2 D) such that
p(t)  p(NO)   cB(t) for all t 2 D. Any such mechanism clearly satises IR and IC,
rather than just IR and the necessary conditions of IC required in the relaxed problem.
Thus, this mechanism is indeed optimal among all sales mechanisms with non-random
disclosure.
184.2 Optimal price-list mechanism
In Section 4.1, I showed that the optimal sales mechanism with costly disclosure is a
price-list mechanism. Here, I will characterize the optimal such mechanism.
The seller's objective is to select the set of \discount types" D  T who will be
eligible for a discount and the schedule of prices fp(NO);p(t) : t 2 Dg so as to maximize
expected prot, subject to the constraint that all discount types must at least weakly
prefer to disclose and buy at price p(t) than not disclose and buy at price p(NO). That








subject to p(t)  p(NO)   cB(t) for all t 2 D.
Theorem 2. The set of types D who qualify for a discount and the schedule of prices






p(1   F(pjt))g(t)dt (9)
p
(t) = argmax







(p   cS(t))(1   F(p + cB(t)jt))
(11)
Discussion: The sticker price (9) is the optimal monopoly price against the endogenous
set of buyer types who do not disclose. Similarly, the discount (10) oered to each type
t 2 D is the optimal monopoly price against a type-t buyer, in an environment in which
the buyer has value distributed as (v  cB(t))jt and the seller has constant marginal cost
equal to cS(t). (Intuition: Disclosure costs are not sunk when the seller sets the type-t
price nor when type-t buyers decide whether to buy the good.)
While natural, these properties of the sticker price p(NO) and customized prices
fp(t) : t 2 Dg are not obvious. Since the incentive to disclose depends on the sticker
price, one might expect the optimal sticker price to be constrained by the customized
19prices being oered. To see why this does not arise, suppose for the sake of contradiction
that p(t) = p(NO) cB(t) for some t 2 D. Type-t buyers are then indierent between
disclosing and paying p(NO), or disclosing and paying p(t). However, the seller is not
indierent, since she sells to the same set of buyers (those of type t with values greater
than p(NO)) but prots c(t) more when such buyers purchases at sticker price. Thus,
the seller would have been better o forcing type-t buyers to pay sticker price.
Least obvious is how to construct the optimal set of discount types D. (11) estab-
lishes an important property of D that characterizes it in terms of the optimal sticker
price p(NO). In particular, type-t buyers will be induced to disclose i, against type-t
buyers only, the customized price (10) with disclosure is strictly more protable than
the sticker price (9) without disclosure. In this sense, the problem of whether to oer
customized discounts is separable across types.
Computing the optimal price-list mechanism. Theorem 2 suggests a numerical
approach to compute the optimal price-list mechanism. For any candidate sticker price
p(NO), (11) uniquely determines the optimal set of discount types D(p(NO) if p(NO)
is the optimal sticker price. Conversely, given a disclosing set D, rst-order condition (9)
uniquely determines the optimal sticker price p(D) if D is the optimal disclosing set. All
together, the optimal sticker price and optimal disclosing set must satisfy the xed-point
condition that p(D(p(NO))) = p(NO) and D(p(D)) = D. While this is a necessary
condition of the optimal price-list mechanism, it is not sucient. In principle, one must
identify all such xed points. The optimal mechanism corresponds to whichever xed
point generates the greatest expected prot for the seller.
Example 2. Suppose that the buyer's type t  U[0;1], the buyer's value vjt  U[0;t]
conditional on type t, and the buyer pays disclosure cost cB(t) = c(t) while the seller
pays nothing.
For any given sticker price p(NO), what is the optimal set of types D(p(NO)) to be
oered a customized price p(t)  p(NO) c(t)? (If p(t) > p(NO) c(t), then every type-t
20buyer will prefer to not disclose and buy the good at sticker price.) If pooled at the sticker
price, type-t buyers generate expected prot p(NO)(1   F(p(NO)jt)) =
p(NO)(t p(NO))
t .
On the other hand, if oered customized price p(t), they generate expected prot of
at most maxp(t)p c p(t)(1   F(p(t) + c)jt)) = maxp(t)p c
p(t)(t p(t) c)
t . As can be easily





p c(t); otherwise, customized price revenue is at most (p(NO) c)(1 F(p(NO)jt)) <
p(NO)(1 F(p(NO)jt)), in which case the seller strictly prefers to sell at the sticker price
only. So, consider the case in which t c
2 < p(NO) c(t) or, equivalently, t < 2p(NO) c(t).







) t < 2p(NO) + c   2
p
p(NO)c: (12)
In particular, the set of buyer-types not oered a discount in the optimal price-list mech-
anism is an increasing interval of the form [t;1], where t = 2p(NO)+c 2
p
p(NO)c.























Proposition 3 summarizes these ndings.
Proposition 3. In the optimal price-list mechanism in Example 2, the seller oers
sticker price p(NO) as well as customized prices p(t) = t c
2 to buyers who disclose











Finitely many types. Online shoppers frequently qualify for discounts by providing
a \promotional code", proving to the seller that they are aware of the code. Such codes
may be distributed to a targeted buyer segment through an email or marketing campaign,
in which case awareness proves that the buyer belongs to this market segment. Or, they
may be available on websites that may only be searched by a subset of potential buyers,
in which case awareness proves that the buyer is the sort who searches the website. In
either case, there are just two \types" of buyer, whereas the baseline model assumes a
continuum of buyers.10
Fortunately, all results extend directly to settings with nitely many buyer types, un-
der an appropriate re-interpretation. To see why, imagine for the moment a hypothetical
situation in which the buyer can disclose an uninformative \label" drawn uniformly from
[0;1] as well as one of nitely many payo-relevant types t 2 T. Since a density now
exists over the enlarged type-space T  [0;1], this paper characterizes the optimal sales
mechanism, which takes the form of a price-list mechanism. By Theorem 2, the seller is
not indierent between oering a sticker price or a customized price to any type of buyer
in this optimal mechanism. Consequently, buyers having the same payo-relevant type
but dierent labels must either all disclose or all not disclose their types and labels in
the optimal mechanism. In particular, this mechanism remains optimal in the model of
interest, with nitely many types but no labels.
Fixed costs of enabling disclosure. Newspaper coupons are similar to promotional
codes, in that using a coupon \discloses" that the buyer uses coupons, but with the extra
feature that the seller must pay a xed cost to place the coupon in the paper and thereby
enable buyer disclosure. By contrast, the baseline model assumes that all disclosure
10Another notable feature of this example is that buyers cannot feasibly disclose that they do not
know the promotional code. This can be accommodated within the baseline model, by assuming an
innite cost to disclose unawareness.
22costs are marginal costs, paid only upon disclosure. Fortunately, it is simple to extend
the analysis to endogenize the set of types that can be disclosed. Suppose that, for all
T 0  T, the seller must incur xed cost C(T 0) to enable the buyer to disclose that his
type is t for any t 2 T 0. This paper characterizes the seller's subsequent variable prot
(T 0) in the optimal price-list mechanism when types T 0 can be disclosed. To maximize
prots, then, the seller will enable disclosure of all types in argmaxT0T ((T 0)   C(T 0)).
Private cost of service. The cost of service may vary across buyers in a way that
is unknown to the seller. For example, closing a sale often brings ancillary benets of
service, the value of which may depend on the buyer's type. To accommodate this,
consider an extension in which the buyer's private information consists of a value v, a
(potentially negative) cost of service s, and a disclosable type t. Let S(v;s;t) denote the
expected surplus that is oered to buyer (v;s;t) in a given mechanism. As in the baseline
analysis, incentive-compatibility (IC) requires that S(v;s;t) = S(0;s;t) +
R v
0 q(~ v;s;t)d~ v
for all (s;t), where q(v;s;t) is the probability that buyer (v;s;t) receives the good. At the
same time, IC requires that S(v;s;t) = S(v;s0;t)  S(v;t) for all (v;t) and all costs s;s0,
since buyer (v;s;t) can earn S(v;s0;t) by \mimicking" buyer (v;s0;t), and vice versa.
In particular, these conditions together imply that q(v;s;t) = q(v;s0;t)  q(v;t) for all
costs s0;s.
The seller's objective in this richer setting is therefore very similar to that in the
baseline case with known cost of service. Namely, the seller seeks to maximize an objective
equal to that in (7) minus an extra term
R R
q(v;t)E[sjv;t]f(vjt)dvg(t)dt related to the
expected cost of service. The rest of the analysis of Section 4 carries through with only
minor modications. In particular, the optimal sales mechanism with costly disclosure
is still a price-list mechanism.
235 Concluding Remarks
Standard monopoly pricing models of a single, indivisible, perishable good take as given
what the monopolist knows about the distribution of buyer values: either values are per-
fectly known (perfect price discrimination), some payo-relevant characteristic is known
(market segmentation), or nothing is known (uniform pricing). This paper endogenizes
what the monopolist knows about buyers when setting prices, in a setting with costly
disclosure of a payo-relevant characteristic. The optimal sales mechanism takes a famil-
iar form: the seller oers a \sticker price" to any buyer, as well as a pre-specied list of
discounts to qualifying buyers (Theorem 1).
This optimal sales mechanism bears a close resemblance to standard, optimal monopoly
market segmentation. In particular, the optimal sticker price is equal to the optimal
monopoly price against the endogenous segment of buyers who choose not to disclose
their type (Theorem 2). However, there are important dierences. For one thing, since
disclosure is costly, the practice of perfect price discrimination need not increase total
welfare. Indeed, as long as the fraction of buyers receiving fully-extractive customized
prices is small enough, one may infer that total welfare is lower than if price discrimina-
tion were not possible (Proposition 2).
I conclude by discussing some signicant issues not addressed by this paper's analysis,
which might be interesting topics for future work.
Listing costs. The optimal pricing mechanism derived here can be viewed as a list of
prices: a \sticker price" available to any buyer, as well as a schedule of discounts available
to certain buyer types. An implicit assumption here is that the seller incurs no extra cost
when adding another price to this list. Consequently, the optimal mechanism exhibits
a potentially unrealistic proliferation of discounts. A worthwhile topic for future work
would be to examine the impact of listing costs on what discounts are oered, as well as
on seller prots and buyer welfare.
24Fairness concerns. Buyers may view some price-discrimination practices as unfair,
and such fairness concerns may be important in shaping the set of discounts that a rm
oers. For instance, in the context of restaurant pricing in Singapore, Sweden, and the
United States, Kimes and Wirtz (2003) nd that customers view coupons, time-of-day
pricing, and lunch/dinner pricing as fair, but view weekday/weekend pricing and table
location pricing as unfair. More broadly, fairness concerns may be an important factor
limiting the practice of price discrimination. Amazon famously faced a customer backlash
when it was found in 2000 to oer dierent prices to online customers having dierent
purchasing histories (Ward (2000)), while Best Buy faced bad press and an investigation
of its pricing practices in 2007 when it was discovered that prices oered in its brick-
and-mortar stores diered from those oered on the internet (Marco (2007)). Both rms
subsequently discontinued these pricing practices.
Future benets. The model here assumes non-negative disclosure costs, but this is
not realistic in some important settings. For example, sellers of experience goods and
services often oer rst-time buyer discounts, e.g. the nationwide tanning salon L.A.
Tan oers a \Free $50 tanning value" coupon to new customers only. To restrict such
a discount to rst-time buyers, the seller needs to check and update a database listing
all users of its product who have ever claimed the rst-timer discount. Updating such
a database may provide future benets to the seller and hence correspond to a negative
disclosure cost, if it enables the seller to extract more revenue from its relationship with
the buyer. Of course, if buyers are rational, they will demand a suciently attractive
discount today to undo any such future revenue-extraction benet enjoyed by the seller.
In that case, total disclosure cost would be positive. On the other hand, if the database
allows the seller to provide more valuable products and services and thereby increase
total surplus in the relationship, total disclosure costs would be negative.
As this example suggests, negative disclosure costs arise naturally when the seller
and/or buyer get some future benet from disclosure today. Indeed, search engines,
25social networks and other information intermediaries often provide their services for free,
in exchange for their users' willingness to share information about themselves that can
then be used to customize advertisements or other product oerings. While this paper's
analysis can be easily generalized to accommodate negative total disclosure costs { the
optimal mechanism will always induce disclosure { research is needed to understand more
deeply the role of future benets in relationships with disclosure. For one thing, whereas
the buyer here must either reveal his type fully or else not at all, future work could
attempt to endogenize what information is shared, and when.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and its corollary
Proof. Suppose that the seller oers sticker price p(NO). To induce type-v buyers to
disclose, the seller must oer customized price p(v)  minfv c;p(NO) cg. In particular,
the seller will not nd it protable to induce disclosure from any buyer having value
v  p(NO) or v  c. On the other hand, all buyers having values v 2 (c;p(NO)) refuse
to pay the sticker price but can be protably induced to disclose. Further, the optimal
customized price for any such type is clearly that which extracts all of the surplus, i.e.
p(v) = v   c. All together, the seller's expected prot given sticker price p(NO) = p
and optimally-induced disclosure of buyer-types v 2 (c;p) equals
(p) = p(1   F(p)) +
Z p
minfp;cg













f(v)(v   c)dv: (16)









26A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Part I: Buyer surplus and seller prot. The set of values (or \types") v 2 [0;1 c]
that receive zero ex post surplus is non-increasing in c, while (16) implies that the sticker-
price paid by all other buyer-types is also non-increasing in c. Thus, the buyer's ex post
surplus is non-decreasing in c. Let (c) be the seller's expected prot, viewed now
as a function of disclosure cost c, and let p(NO;c) be the optimal sticker price given






f(v)dv  0 (17)
so that the seller's expected prot is non-increasing in c.
Part II: Total welfare. Let p = argmaxp p(1   F(p)) be the optimal uniform price.
For all c > p, p(NO;c) = p and ex post welfare is the same with or without the
possibility of disclosure. Suppose that the cost of disclosure decreases from ch to cl, for
any cl < ch  p. There are three eects on total welfare. First, buyers having value
v 2 (cl;ch) now receive the good (after disclosure at cost cl), for an expected welfare gain
of at most (ch   cl)(F(ch)   F(cl)). Second, buyers having value v 2 (ch;p(NO;ch))
disclose at lower cost, for expected welfare gain (ch cl)(F(p(NO;ch)) F(ch)). Finally,
buyers having value v 2 (p(NO;ch);p(NO;cl)) now disclose, for an expected welfare
loss cl(F(p(NO;cl))   F(p(NO;ch))).
Consider now ch = p and cl = p   , where  > 0. Since p(NO;p) = p,
the second eect disappears and the expected welfare gain associated with lowering the
disclosure cost from p to p    is at most
(F(p
)   F(p
   ))   (p
   )(F(p
(NO;p
   ))   F(p
)): (18)
To prove that total welfare falls as disclosure costs fall from p to p  for small enough
, it suces to show that lim!0
F(p(NO;p )) F(p)
 > 0. Since F() has well-dened
density, this condition holds i lim!0
p(NO;p ) p
 > 0.
By (16), p(NO;c) satises necessary condition f(p(NO;c))c = 1 F(p(NO;c)) for
27all c  p. In particular, the total derivative
d[f(p(NO;c))c+F(p(NO;c))]
dc = 0. Since F();f()




f(p(NO;c))+cf0(p(NO;c)) < 0 exists.
We conclude that total welfare is strictly increasing in disclosure cost c, over the range
c 2 (p  ;p) for some  > 0. Let (c) = F(p(NO;c)) F(c) be the probability that
the buyer receives a discount. Equivalently, we have shown that total welfare is strictly
increasing in c whenever (c) < (p   ).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. By the Envelope Theorem,
@(maxm S(m;v;t))
@v = q(m(v;t)). In particular, buyer (v;t)'s
probability of receiving the good q(m1) = q(m2)  q(v;t) for all m1;m2 2 M(v;t).
The buyer's expected surplus S(v;t) =
R v
0 q(~ v;t)d~ v + S(0;t). In particular, the buyer's
payment net of buyer disclosure cost z(m1) + cB(t)  1m12Mt = z(m2) + cB(t)  1m22Mt =
vq(v;t)  
R v
0 q(~ v;t)d~ v   S(0;t) for all m1;m2 2 M(v;t).
Suppose f.s.o.c. that there is a positive measure of buyers that disclose with probabil-
ity between zero and one in the optimal mechanism, i.e. for each such buyer there exists
m1(v;t);m2(v;t) 2 M(v;t) such that m1(v;t) 2 M; and m2(v;t) 2 Mt. The seller can
strictly increase expected prot from these buyers by inducing each to send only the non-
disclosing message m1(v;t): payment from the buyer increases by cB(t) while the seller
avoids disclosure cost cS(t). At the same, no other buyer has any new incentive to deviate
since the non-disclosing message m1(v;t) was already available to all buyers. Thus, all
other buyers remain equally protable and the seller can strictly increase expected prot,
contradicting the assumption that the original mechanism was optimal.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. IR implies S(0;t)  0, while IC implies S(v;t) =
R v
0 q(~ v;t)d~ v + S(0;t); see the
proof of Lemma 1. As usual, IC also implies the monotonicity constraint (4). Let
S(v0;t;v;t) denote buyer (v0;t)'s surplus when mimicking buyer (v;t). S(v0;t;v;t) =
S(v;t) + (v0   v)q(v;t), while vice versa S(v;t;v0;t) = S(v0;t)   (v0   v)q(v0;t). IC
28requires S(v0;t)   S(v0;t;v;t)) + S(v;t)   S(v;t;v0;t) = (v0   v)(q(v0;t)   q(v;t))  0.
Namely, v0 > v implies q(v0;t)  q(v;t). Finally, suppose f.s.o.c. that S(v;t) > S(v;t0)
for some t0 6= t, but (v;t) 2 NO. S(v;t0)  S(v;t0;v;t) by IC while S(v;t0;v;t) = S(v;t)
by (v;t) 2 NO, a contradiction.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3(a): S(v;t) > mint0 S(v;t0) implies (v;t) 2 Y ES by (5). And, since
disclosure is costly, the seller maximizes (7) by only inducing buyer (v;t) to disclose
when (5) requires disclosure. Thus, the set of buyers such that (v;t) 2 Y ES and
S(v;t) = mint0 S(v;t0) must have zero measure.
Proof of Lemma 3(b): For all v, let T(v) = argmint S(v;t). By Lemma 3(a), (v;t) 2
NO i t 2 T(v). Let t(v) denote any selection from fT(v) : v 2 V g. For any v0 > v,
buyers (v;t(v)), (v0;t(v0)) can mimic each other. Buyer (v;t(v))'s surplus from mimicking
(v0;t(v0)) equals S(v0;t(v0))   (v0   v)q(v0;t(v0)), while buyer (v0;t(v0))'s surplus from

















By (19-20), q(v0;t(v0)) 
S(v0;t(v0)) S(v;t(v))
v0 v  q(v;t(v)). Since this is true for any
selection t(v), inft2T(v0) q(v0;t)  supt2T(v) q(v;t). Namely, q(v;t) = q(v;t0) for a full-
measure set of types t;t0 2 T(v), for a full-measure set of values. Further, by (19-20),
lim"!0
S(v+";t(v+")) S(v;t(v))
" = lim"!0 q(v + ";t(v)), and lim"!0
S(v;t(v)) S(v ";t(v "))
" =
lim"!0 q(v   ";t(v)). Namely, again for a full-measure set of buyers (v;t) 2 NO,
q(v;t) = q;NO(v), where we dene q;NO(v) 
d[mint0 S(v;t0)]
dv .
Proof of Lemma 3(c): Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists v00 > v0 > v
such that (v;t) 2 NO, (v0;t) 2 Y ES, and (v00;t) 2 NO. By Lemma 3(a), S(v0;t) >
mint0 S(v0;t0) while S(~ v;t) = mint0 S(~ v;t0) for ~ v 2 fv;v00g. By continuity, there exists
29v = inff~ v < v0 : (v;t) 2 Y ES for all v 2 (~ v;v0)g < v0 and v = supf~ v > v0 : (v;t) 2 Y ES
for all v 2 (v0; ~ v)g > v0. Further, S(~ v;t) = mint0 S(v;t0) for ~ v 2 fv;vg.
Consider changing type-t buyers' allocation probabilities, from q(;t) to ^ q(;t):
^ q(v;t) = q
(v;t) for all v 62 (v;v)
= q
;NO(v;t) for all v 2 (v;v)
Let ^ S(v;t) = S(0;t) +
R v
0 ^ q(~ v;t)d~ v denote type-t buyer surpluses when the mechanism
is changed in this way. Note that ^ S(v;t) = S(v;t) for all v 62 (v;v) while ^ S(v;t) =
mint0 S(v;t0) for all v 2 (v;v). Thus, after this change, the seller can increase prot from
type-t buyers by no longer inducing disclosure of buyers (v;t) for v 2 (v;v). (Further,
no other buyers must now be induced to disclose.)
To establish the contradiction and complete the proof, it suces to show that this









(^ q(v;t)   q
(v;t))MR(v;t)f(vjt)dv > 0 (22)
Here, the equality follows from the denition of ^ q(;t), while the inequality follows from
three facts:11 (i)
R v
v (^ q(v;t)   q(v;t))dv = 0, since (v;t);(v;t) 2 NO implies that
R v
v ^ q(v;t)dv =
R v
v q(v;t)dv = mint0 S(v;t0)   mint0 S(v;t0); (ii)
R v
v (^ q(~ v;t)   q(~ v;t))
d~ v < 0 for all v 2 (v;v), since (v;t) 2 Y ES for all such values; and (iii) MR(v;t)f(vjt)
= vf(vjt) + F(vjt)   1 is strictly increasing in v since, by assumption, revenue R(p;t) =
p(1   F(pjt) is strictly concave in p for all t.12
Proof of Lemma 3(d): Dene vl(t) = inffv : (v;t) 2 NOg and vh(t) = supfv : (v;t) 2
NOg, with vl(t) = vh(t) = 1 should (v;t) 2 Y ES for all v. By continuity and
11Let h();k() be any functions such that k(v) is strictly increasing in v,
R v
v h(~ v)d~ v < 0 for all
v 2 (v;v), and
R v
v h(~ v)d~ v = 0. Then
R v
v h(v)k(v)dv > 0. (Details straightforward and omitted.) Here,
let h(v) = ^ q(v;t)   q(v;t) and k(v) = MR(v;t)f(vjt).
12 d[p(1 F(pjt)]
dp =  MR(p;t)f(pjt). This concavity assumption is used nowhere else in the proof.
30denition of vh(t), S(vh(t);t) = mint0 S(vh(t);t0) and S(v;t) > mint0 S(v;t0) for all





limv&vh(t) q(v;t)  q;NO(vh(t)) by (3). Since q(;t) is non-decreasing, we conclude that
q(v;t)  q;NO(vh(t)) for all v > vh(t).
Consider any type-t allocation probabilities ^ q(;t) such that ^ q(v;t) = q(v;t) for
all v  vh(t) and ^ q(v;t) is non-decreasing in v for all v  vh(t). This monotonicity
guarantees incentive-compatibility (IC) within type-t buyers, while IC across buyer types
is automatically satised by the fact that buyer (v;t) 2 Y ES for all v > vh(t). Thus, the
optimal allocation probabilities q(;t) must maximize the seller's expected prot from
disclosing type-t buyers in isolation,
fq
(v;t) : v > v




(q(v;t)MR(v;t)   c(t))f(vjt)dv (23)
subject only to the condition that v0 > v > vh(t) implies q(v0;t)  q(v;t)  q(vh(t);t).
(Disclosure costs in (23) are paid regardless of whether the buyer receives the object.)
This problem is very similar to the standard monopoly pricing problem, where the
seller is faced with a type-t buyer whose value is truncated to be at least vh(t). The only
dierence is that the seller is constrained to sell the good to all buyers with probability
at least q(vh(t);t)  0. Nonetheless, it is easy to see that solution to this maximization
is \bang-bang", as in the standard case. Dene





The solution has q(v;t) = 1 for all v > v0(t) and q(v;t) = q(vh(t);t) for all v 2
(vh(t);v0(t)).
To complete the proof, I need to show that vh(t)  v0(t). Suppose f.s.o.c. that v0(t) >
vh(t). As shown earlier, q(v;t) = q;NO(vh(t))  q;NO(v) for all v 2 (vh(t);v0(t)).
Thus, S(v;t) = S(vh(t);t) +
R v
vh(t) q(~ v;t)d~ v = mint0 S(vh(t);t0) +
R v
vh(t) q(~ v;t)d~ v 
mint0 S(v;t0), contradicting (v;t) 2 Y ES.
Proof of Lemma 3(e): (0;t) 2 NO by Lemma 4,13 while (v;t) 2 Y ES implies (v0;t) 2
13 While presented later in the text, the proof of Lemma 4 does not use Lemma 3(e).
31Y ES for all v0 > v by Lemma 3(c). Thus, v;d(t) = supfv : (v;t) 2 NOg.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. mint S(0;t) = 0 since otherwise the seller can increase prot by equally reducing
S(0;t) for all t. Suppose f.s.o.c. that maxt S(0;t) > 0 and let ^ t 2 argmaxt S(0;t).
Since S(0;^ t) > mint S(0;t), buyer (0;^ t) 2 Y ES. By the proof of Lemma 3, S(v;t) >
mint0 S(v;t0) for all v < vl(t) and, if vl(t) < 1, S(vl(t);t) = mint0 S(vl(t);t0), where
vl(t)  inffv : (v;t) 2 NOg and vl(t) = 1 if (v;t) 2 Y ES for all v. To complete the
proof, I need to show that vl(t) = 0.
Suppose f.s.o.c. that vl(t) > 0. I shall consider two cases separately.
First case: q(v;t) = q(0;t) for all v < vl(t). Consider a change in which, for some " > 0,
the seller (i) raises type-t allocation probabilities from q(v;t) to ^ q"(v;t) = q(v;t) + "
for all v < vl(t), leaving other allocation probabilities unchanged, (ii) lowers zero-value
surplus from S(0;t) to ^ S"(0;t) = S(0;t)   "vl(t), and (iii) does not change buyer
disclosure. Let ^ S"(v;t) = S(v;t)   "(vl(t)   v) denote the induced buyer surplus for all
v < vl(t). (Buyer (v;t)'s surplus does not change for all v  vl(t).) For small enough
" > 0, such a change does not violate any of the constraints of the seller's relaxed problem.





Monotonicity IC constraint (4): It suces to show that q(;t) is discontinuous at vl(t),
since then ^ q"(vl(t) ;t) = q(vl(t) ;t) + " < q(vl(t)+;t) for all small enough ".14 In
fact, I will establish a stronger fact that q(vl(t) ;t) < q;NO(vl(t) ). (This desired
discontinuity of q(;t) at vl(t) follows since q(vl(t)+;t) = q;NO(vl(t)+) and q;NO() is
non-decreasing by Lemma 3(b) and since (vl(t);t) 2 NO.)
Suppose f.s.o.c. that q(vl(t) ;t)  q;NO(vl(t) ;t), so that q(^ v;t)  q;NO(vl(t) ;t)
14h(x ) = lim"!0 h(x   ") and h(x+) = lim"!0 h(x + ") denote left- and right-limits, respectively.
Notation to account for possible discontinuities is suppressed in most proofs, but here it is important to
account carefully for discontinuities.
32for any ^ v < vl(t). By denition of vl(t), S(vl(t);t) = mint0 S(vl(t);t0). By Lemma
2 and Lemma 3(b),
dS(^ v;t)
dv = q(^ v;t) while
d[mint0 S(^ v;t0)]
dv = q;NO(^ v), where q;NO(^ v) 
q;NO(vl(t) ) by Lemma 3(b). Thus, mint0 S(^ v;t0)  S(vl(t);t) 
R vl(t)
^ v q;NO(vl(t) )dv 
S(vl(t);t)  
R vl(t)
^ v q(v;t)dv = S(^ v;t). This contradicts the denition of vl(t), since
^ v < vl(t) implies (^ v;t) 2 Y ES and hence S(^ v;t) > mint0 S(^ v;t0) by Lemma 3(a).
Disclosure IC constraint (5): It suces to show that, for small enough ", ^ S"(v;t) >
mint0 S(v;t0) for all v < vl(t). (Otherwise, some type-t buyers would now have an
incentive to mimic other types who currently do not disclose, forcing the seller to incur
the cost of inducing these other buyers to disclose.)




dv , so that ^ S"(v;t) >




and all small enough . Let () = minv2[0;vl(t) @] 
^ S"(v;t)   mint0 S(v;t0)

. Since buyer surplus changes by at most "vl(t), ^ S"(v;t) >
mint0 S(v;t0) for all v 2 [0;vl(t)   @] as long as " <
()
vl(t).
Seller prot from type-t buyers increases: Total expected surplus is increasing in alloca-
tion probabilities but decreasing in the set of buyers who must be induced to disclose.
Since the change considered here increases allocation probabilities and leaves disclosure
unchanged, total expected surplus is higher than before. On the other hand, type-t
buyer surpluses have decreased: ^ S(v;t) < S(v;t) for all v < vl(t) and surpluses are
unchanged for other buyers. Thus, the seller's expected prot from type-t buyers has
strictly increased, contradicting the presumed optimality of the original mechanism.
Second case: there exists ^ v > 0 such that q(0+;t) < q(v;t) < q(vl(t) ;t) . The
proof for this case is very similar, though it is somewhat more complicated to dene
the new probabilities ^ q"(v;t) so as to respect the monotonicity constraint. Dene ^  =
maxv^ v (S(v;t)   mint0 S(v;t0)); ^  > 0 by continuity of buyer surplus, since ^ v < vl(t)





^ "(v;t)   q
(v;t)

dv = ^ =2




(^ v;t)g for all v 2 [0; ^ v]:
Clearly, q^ "(v;t)  q(v;t) for all v  ^ v, while q^ "(v;t) > q(v;t) for all small enough v.
Consider a change to the mechanism in which the seller (i) raises type-t allocation
probabilities from q(v;t) to q^ "(v;t) for all v  ^ v, leaving all other allocation probabilities
unchanged, (ii) lowers zero-value surplus from S(0;t) to ^ S(0;t) = S(0;t)   ^ =2, and
(iii) does not change buyer disclosure. Let ^ S(v;t) = ^ S(0;t) +
R v
0 q^ "(~ v;t)d~ v denote the
resulting surplus for all type-t buyers.
Such a change does not violate any of the constraints of the seller's relaxed problem.
IR constraint (3): ^ S(0;t)  =2 > 0. Monotonicity IC constraint (4): By construction,
q^ "(v;t) is non-decreasing in v for v 2 [0; ^ v] and q^ "(^ v;t) = q(^ v;t). Disclosure IC constraint
(5): ^ S(v;t) = S(v;t) for all v  ^ v since ^ S(^ v;t) = S(^ v;t) and allocation probabilities
are unchanged to values v > ^ v. Thus, it suces to show that ^ S(v;t) > mint0 S(v;t0)
for all v < ^ v. By denition of ^  and construction of q^ "(;t), ^ S(v;t)  S(v;t)   =2 
mint0 S(v;t0) + =2 for all v  ^ v.
As in the rst case above, the seller's expected prot from type-t buyers increases
because total expected surplus increases while buyers' surpluses weakly decrease. This
is again a contradiction, completing the proof.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 5
Let T NO(v) = ft 2 T : v;d(t) > vg be those types that the buyer does not disclose
given value v. (v;d(t) is dened in Lemma 3.) Dene e f(v) =
R
t2TNO(v) f(vjt)g(t)dt




t2TNO(v) f(vjt)g(t)dt . The rst term of the objective (8) now becomes
R
q;NO(v)g MR(v)e f(v)dv, so that maximizing this term is equivalent to maximizing rev-
enue in a (hypothetical) market segment consisting of only the non-disclosing buyers,
having marginal revenue g MR() and density e f().15 The solution to this problem is
15 e f() can be viewed as the density of a distribution with an atom of mass Pr((v;t) 2 Y ES) at zero.
34well-known (see e.g. Section 6 of Bulow and Roberts (1989)) and amounts to a take-it-
or-leave-it price. In particular, there exists a threshold v;NO (corresponding to a price to
non-disclosers) such that q;NO = 0 for all v < v;NO and q;NO = 1 for all v > v;NO.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. By denition, a price-list mechanism (D;p(NO);p(t) : t 2 D) is a sales mechanism
with non-random disclosure in which (i) for all t 2 D, q(v;t) = S(v;t) = 0 for all v <
p(t)+cB(t) while q(v;t) = 1 and S(v;t) = v p(t) cB(t) for all v > p(t)+cB(t), and (ii) for
all t 62 D, q(v;t) = S(v;t) = 0 for all v < p(NO) while q(v;t) = 1 and S(v;t) = v p(NO)
for all v > p(NO). Let D = ft : v;d(t) < 1g. By Lemmas 3-5, there exist thresholds
fv;NO;v;d(t) : t 2 Dg such that (i) for all t 2 D, q(v;t) = S(v;t) = 0 for all
v < minfv;NO;v;d(t)g while q(v;t) = 1 and S(v;t) = v   minfv;NO;v;d(t)g for all
v > minfv;NO;v;d(t)g, (ii) for all t 62 D, q(v;t) = S(v;t) = 0 for all v < v;NO
while q(v;t) = 1 and S(v;t) = v   v;NO for all v > v;NO. Thus, this is a price-list
mechanism with disclosing types D, sticker price p(NO) = v;NO, and customized
prices p(t) = minfv;NO;v;d(t)   cB(t)g for all t 2 D.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that v;NO > v;d(t) for all t 2 D, since
then p(t) = v;d(t)   cB(t). Suppose f.s.o.c. that v;d(t)  v;NO for some t 2 D and
x ^ v > v;d(t) so that (^ v;t) 2 Y ES. Type-t buyers receive the good i v > v;NO,
so S(^ v;t) = ^ v   v;NO. However, (^ v;t0) 2 NO and S(^ v;t0) = ^ v   v;NO for every
t0 62 D. Thus, S(^ v;t) = mint0 S(^ v;t0) and hence (^ v;t) 2 NO by Lemma 3(a), a
contradiction.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Part I: discount condition (10). Consider any price-list mechanism with sticker
price p(NO) and disclosing set D 3 t. Since disclosure costs cB(t);cS(t) are incurred
by the buyer and seller when a sale occurs to a buyer of type t, but not otherwise,
the seller's problem when setting the customized price p(t) is equivalent to that of a
35monopolist facing a buyer whose value is distributed as (v  cB(t))jt given marginal cost
cS(t) and a price ceiling of p(NO)   cB(t). (If the price ceiling is violated, no type-t
buyer will ever choose to disclose, contradicting the presumption that t 2 D.) Thus, if
p(NO)   cB(t) > p(t), then p(t) is the optimal customized price for type-t buyers.
Since p(t)  p(NO)   cB(t) by disclosure incentive-compatibility, to complete the
proof it suces to show that p(t) > p(NO) cB(t) for the optimal sticker price p(NO).
Suppose f.s.o.c. that p(t) = p(NO)   cB(t), i.e. that maxpp(NO) cB(t)(p   cS(t))(1  
F(p+cB(t)jt)) = (p(NO) c(t))(1 F(p(NO)jt)). Yet revoking type-t buyers' eligibility
for a discount and forcing them to pay sticker price would yield strictly greater expected
prot from them, p(NO)(1   F(p(NO)jt)), a contradiction.
Part II: sticker-price condition (9). Consider any price-list mechanism with disclosing
set D, sticker price p(NO), and discounts p(t)  p(NO) cB(t) for all t 2 D. Increasing
the sticker price from p(NO) to p(NO) + " is feasible and protable for small enough




g(t)dt  0: (24)
Decreasing the sticker price from p(NO) to p(NO)   " is feasible as well, as long as
each discount p(t) is also decreased to minfp(t);p(NO)   "   cB(t)g so as to maintain
disclosure incentive-compatibility for all types t 2 D. Such a pricing change is protable





g(t)dt  0: (25)
However, as shown in the proof of (10), p(t) < p(NO) cB(t) for all t 2 D. Thus, the





g(t)dt = 0: (26)
Note that (26) is the standard rst-order condition of a monopoly seller who faces a
buyer having value randomly distributed as vjt 62 D, and uniquely identies p(NO) as




36Disclosing-set condition (11). \(". Suppose that type-t buyers are induced to disclose
in the optimal price-list mechanism, i.e. t 2 D. As shown in the proof of (10), p(t) <
p(NO)   cB(t), so that maxpp(NO) cB(t) (p   cS(t))(1   F(p + cB(t)jt)) is realized at
customized price p(t). Suppose for the sake of contradiction (f.s.o.c.) that p(NO)(1  
F(p(NO)jt)) > (p(t)   cS(t))(1   F(p(t) + cB(t)jt)). If so, the seller can increase
expected prot by revoking type-t buyers' eligibility for a discount, contradicting the
presumption of optimality.
\)". Suppose that t 62 D and let ^ p(t) = argmaxpp(NO) cB(t) (p   cS(t))(1   F(p + cB(t)jt)).
Suppose f.s.o.c. that p(NO)(1   F(p(NO)jt)) < (^ p(t)   cS(t))(1   F(^ p(t) + cB(t)jt)).
If so, the seller can increase expected prot by inducing type-t buyers to disclose their
type with a customized price p(t) = ^ p(t), contradicting the presumption of optimality.
Finally, dene
Z = ft 2 T : p
(NO)(1   F(p
(NO)jt)) = (^ p(t)   cS(t))(1   F(^ p(t) + cB(t)jt))g: (27)
To complete the proof, it suces to show Z \D

= ; since then the seller strictly prefers
not to induce any types t 62 D to disclose in the optimal price-list mechanism.
As shorthand, let p(NO;D) denote the optimal sticker price given non-disclosing set
D  T; in particular, the optimal sticker price p(NO) = p(NO;D

) and p(NO;t) =
argmaxp p(1 F(pjt)) denotes the optimal monopoly price without disclosure when faced
with a buyer known to be type t.
Suppose f.s.o.c. that Z \ D

6= ;. If so, the seller can increase expected prot by
(i) inducing every type t 2 Z \ D

to disclose with a customized price of ^ p(t) and (ii)
changing the sticker price from p(NO) to p(NO;D

n Z). By (27), inducing types
t 2 Z \ D

to disclose has no eect on the seller's expected prot from such buyers.
Further, \re-optimizing" the sticker price for all other types D

n Z if anything allows
the seller to increase expected prots from those non-disclosing types that remain. Thus,
such a two-fold modication to the original price-list mechanism must weakly increase
seller expected prot if it does not violate any disclosure IC constraints, i.e. as long as
p(NO;D

n Z)  ^ p(t) + cB(t) for all t 2 D [ Z. To complete the proof, it therefore
37suces to show that p(NO;D

n Z)  p(NO) since then all disclosure IC constraints
become more slack.
t 2 Z implies p(NO;t) < p(NO). Suppose f.s.o.c.that p(NO;t)  p(NO). If so,




violating the denition of Z. The rst inequality follows directly from cB(t);cS(t)  0
and cB(t) + cS(t) > 0, while the second follows indirectly from the presumption that
p(NO;t)  p(NO). Namely, (i)
d[p(1 F(pjt))]
dp > 0 for all p < p(NO;t) since v  
1 F(v)
f(v)
is strictly increasing in v, (ii) ^ p(t)  p(NO) by the denition of ^ p(t), and (iii) p(NO) 
p(NO;t) by presumption. By this contradiction, we conclude p(NO;t) < p(NO) and
in particular that
d[p(NO)(1 F(p(NO)jt))]








n Z), the optimal sticker price against buyer-types D

n Z, is strictly
greater than p(NO). This completes the proof.
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